I recently wrote a popular book about the virtue of justice.1 In thirty-eight thousand words, it describes the setting of just order, the species of law, the nature of particular and general justice, and the contribution of several related virtues. At two points in the book, I mention that I chose not to address subjective rights as that might distract from the emphasis on virtuous agency. Instead, I chose to focus on objective rights. (The subtitle of the book is Judge Rightly, Give Freely.) Fair enough, one might say, but is the reader to understand (based on this editorial decision) that subjective rights have no place in contemporary Catholic discourse?

It’s widely acknowledged that subjective rights have fallen on hard times. Here, I take subjective rights to mean subjective natural rights or “rights that ought to be recognized in all societies because they are necessary for the fulfillment of some basic human needs and purposes.”2 In practically every sector of society, proponents of opposing policies argue vehemently for their positions (both on the basis of rights) without irony or apparent consternation. The rights of the unborn, for instance, are routinely pitted against so-called reproductive rights with seemingly no concern for their commensurability. What is more, the resolution of suchlike exchanges almost wholly excludes substantive agreement as to the nature of what is good for man. Clearly, an appeal to rights is no guarantee of rational coherence or of political efficacy. Within this setting, it falls to moral theorists to determine whether subjective rights are worth the time of day or whether we should employ alternative moral principles for our present purposes. If not subjected to the rigorous demands of truth, an indiscriminate use of current categories might only worsen the deplorable state we are pretending to address.

Certainly, in Christian circles we hear critiques leveled against rights talk. For some, it only reinforces a solipsistic or hyperindividualist freedom inimical to genuine personhood. For others, it contributes to a neglect of both the natural law and prudential reasoning. For others still, it is but the trope of a liberal order that, in pretending to be neutral vis-à-vis the good, only inhibits man’s social flourishing through the draconian enforcement of an ersatz end.3 Rights have come to mean something like what I want and what you can’t (or won’t) deny me except at great political cost. Even in Catholic circles, rights are often invoked for self-serving ends—for buffering the self against the legitimate claims of the other and of the community. And yet, the persistence of subjective rights in moral discourse and moral practice seems to suggest that they correspond to a good in reality and are, thus, worthy of retention. Certainly, the Church has chosen to express herself in these terms.

A Selective History of Rights

We have reason to believe that subjective rights find their proximate juridical origin in the work of canonists, specifically the Decretists of the twelfth century.4 Here, we have a tradition of commentary that attempted to make sense of the concrete effects of faith and sacrament in the lives of God’s people. In their determination of power, delimitation of jurisdiction, and specification of sacramental efficacy, the Decretists sought (among other things) to facilitate the cogent reasoning of those vexed by difficult problems of interpretation and application. And, it seems, rights served their purposes.

Many identify the Second Scholasticism as a time during which subjective rights assumed a more recognizable doctrinal formulation in the Catholic theological tradition. We know further that this tradition was brought directly to bear in pastoral application. The work of theologians like Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1546) and Francisco Suárez (d. 1617) informed missionaries in the New World seeking to address the injustices of colonial settlement.

Many have heard of the work of the first friar missionaries to the island of Hispaniola. Immediately upon arrival in the New World, the friars noted the mistreatment of Indigenous persons to which the encomienda system had given rise. Conscious of their evangelical mandate, they sought to address the situation. On the fourth Sunday of Advent in 1511, after a year of prayer and fasting, Antonio de Montesinos addressed a congregation of encomenderos with the words of the Gospel ringing in their ears, “As it is written in the book of the words of Isaiah the prophet, ‘The voice of one crying in the wilderness: Prepare the way of the Lord, make his paths straight’” (Luke 3:4). Montesinos then began his homily:

I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness . . . and therefore it behooves you to listen to me, not with indifference but with all your heart and senses; for this voice will be the strangest, the harshest and hardest, the most terrifying that you ever heard or expected to hear. . . . This voice declares that you are in mortal sin and live and die therein by reason of the cruelty and tyranny that you practice on these innocent people. Tell me, by what right or justice do you hold these Indians in such cruel and horrible slavery? By what right do you wage such detestable wars on these people?

His conviction was brought to bear with an appeal to right.

From canonical origins through theological formulations to pastoral applications, rights have come to occupy a place of relative importance in Catholic moral formulations. In the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (the authority of which is admittedly circumscribed), rights are spelled out among the principles of Catholic social teaching. While they might not feature in the most compact list of so-called permanent principles, they appear early and often. Paragraph 152, for instance, reads: “The movement towards the identification and proclamation of human rights is one of the most significant attempts to respond effectively to the inescapable demands of human dignity.” The Church sees in them an opportunity “for more effectively recognizing human dignity and universally promoting it as a characteristic inscribed by God the Creator in his creature.”5

Given the place that rights have occupied in Catholic moral discourse and moral practice in the last millennium, I don’t think it's overblown to claim that they pertain to the Church’s social teaching as entailed by human dignity.

Resituating Rights Talk

Mind you, there have been a variety of efforts at repristinating rights for Catholic discourse in the past two generations. The genealogical efforts are well known at this point. A traditional narrative attributes the origins of subjective rights to the Franciscan school, and especially to William of Ockham.6 On this reading, rights talk in the Catholic tradition comes well before the “contributions” of more controversial figures like Grotius and Locke. For some, that is enough. For others, it is not. Given the suspicion with which the Franciscan tradition is viewed in certain corners of the Church, others press on further.

We have also seen several more metaphysical efforts at situating rights talk within a broader doctrinal framework. Some have found a theory of natural rights in St. Thomas Aquinas or have shown the compatibility of his treatment of natural law and a doctrine of subjective rights.7 Most acknowledge that St. Thomas has a notion of objective right and not of subjective right, even as they attempt to discern the basic contours of subjective right in his account.8 Others have sought to root a theory of subjective rights in a doctrine of God and creation native to St. Thomas.9 By appealing to more foundational principles, one provides more of the philosophical picture within which rights talk makes sense and even wields a certain efficacy.

It strikes me, though, that we have an opportunity to adopt a novel approach in resituating rights talk for contemporary discourse, namely, within the setting of Catholic social teaching. On the one hand, Catholic social teaching is a natural fit for rights talk. As it is deployed in the public square, rights talk pertains to politics. Politics is classically understood as the application of ethics. Ethical reasoning that takes its departure from revealed principles is approximately what we mean by moral theology. And as Catholic social teaching (qua tradition of inquiry) is a kind of moral theology, it's a natural fit.

But there are further reasons for which the pairing is pertinent. In the past two generations, we have witnessed rather violent rejections of nature and its law. One need only think of contemporary debates on human sexuality and gender to carry the point. It appears from the sociological data, though, that the advance of antinaturalism has slowed in recent years and even reversed course in certain sectors of society. As the world awakens from its momentary madness, the Church is in a good position to furnish an account for the recent turn of events. The Thomist might instinctually reach for natural law theory, and we have seen considerable publication on this theme in the past two generations. It appears to me, though, that this may not be the prudent move. For, while natural law theory remains largely foreign to our secular contemporaries, natural rights appeal more readily.

We can use this appeal to our advantage without losing anything of the Church’s moral doctrine. Rights can serve as the precise means through which the natural law delimits the responsibility of free persons. Rights can supply a basis on which we vindicate the agency of the unborn, the immature, the infirm, the incapable, and the aged. Rights can sensitize us to a vertical analogy of claims situated within a hierarchy of persons and things (natures) that condition the lower by the higher.

But if rights are to serve in this stead, I think that they need to do so within the setting of the pertinent relationships and interactions that bring their intelligibility to bear. The rights of a child are best understood with reference to his mother (and his father); the rights of a worker with reference to his family (and his company); the rights of a legislator with reference to his constituency (and his God). In short, the human person (and his dignity) is best understood with reference to the community, in relationships and interactions of justice (and charity).

The Evidential Power of Catholic Social Teaching

I recently hosted an event in the United States for which someone traveled from the Netherlands. I was astonished by this woman’s willingness to come six thousand kilometers for what amounted to a day of recollection. Naturally, I took time to speak with her and thanked her. During our exchange, she asked me a simple question: What do you think are the Church’s best resources in the present work of evangelization? I have forgotten my answer, but I probably listed my three favorites: Our Lord’s victory, Our Lady’s intercession, and St. Thomas’s wisdom. Irrespective of what I said, though, I recall her next words: Don’t forget about Catholic social teaching. It’s what got me.

Her experience is not an isolated one. The world is ready for Catholic social teaching. On every side, we witness young people of every imaginable political affiliation concerning themselves with similar objects of communal solicitude: human development, women’s health, ecological stewardship. Even as political polarization distresses an increasingly partisan populace, we see an increasing number of individuals who are willing to break ranks to address urgent social issues in deference to the truth. Take one example: Clinicians have noted a higher rate of nonreligious women abstaining from the use of oral contraception for reasons of health. A greater sensitivity to hormonal imbalance, uterine damage, chronic fertility issues, and even ecological impact has conservative and progressive women implementing similar practices.

Catholics are in a privileged position to testify in these circumstances, but we must be innocent as doves and crafty as serpents. We must address our argumentation to potential converts in language that they can understand. The FEMM App, for instance, is a product developed to help women track their cycle. It markets itself as promoting holistic women’s health. And it does. Though developed under Catholic auspices, it works to communicate in terms of public reason. And by creating space in which women can address symptoms and treat underlying conditions, it facilitates an encounter with the truth of their bodies, even as it removes obstacles to both conception and conversion.

We sometimes forget that the Church is somewhat unique in that she enunciates and implements a coherent moral discourse and moral practice when engaging the world in its different social and political dimensions. In a world where everyone cares about every issue ranging from minimum wage to nuclear waste, I think many people find it quite astonishing that the Church cares with equal intensity, though perhaps not with the same fanaticism. In effect, the Church expresses concern for all creatures in the light of their Creator. This is part of how she is a light to the nations. This is part of her evangelical witness. But the Church’s witness is bolstered still further by the fact that she cares more about Something Else, namely, the glory of God and the salvation of souls.

Discourse and Practice Beyond Politics

In the contemporary space, at the nadir of a century-long slump of secularization, politics has come in several sectors of society to occupy the status of highest concern. With many persons and institutions almost wholly without God, our political struggles are often spurred on by a certain desperation. When one ceases to look beyond the city of man for redemption and deliverance, every setback or reversal registers as a kind of devastation. The Church is uniquely suited to direct man’s gaze beyond the city of man to the city of God, toward a transcendent horizon of God’s choosing. This direction does not so much trivialize present efforts as invest them with the urgency of vocation and enliven them with a spirit of abandon. For, in the end, we are agents of providence, not mere technicians of reality.

If a recovery of rights talk is to enjoy any modicum of success, it will have to attract adherents and practitioners of varied political persuasions, not just from outside the Church but from inside the Church. In effect, we will have to overcome our own political polarization that vexes our Catholic communion. In this way, we may have something to learn from the aforementioned secular contemporaries who are willing to break ranks. It is natural in our Catholic theological, liturgical, and practical lives that we tend to form parties of a certain sort. It is also natural that we find ourselves divided from those with whom we differ on these issues. It is not for nothing that we speak just as readily of liberal and conservative Catholics as of liberal and conservative politicians. The risk with this tendency, though, is that we end up relying upon similar strategies in Catholic circles as in political circles, specifically that we become party men and women.

The language of rights is more native to a liberal political conception than to a conservative one. The suspicion with which many look on rights in conservative circles arises, in part, from the party spirit native to the polarized society. Because progressive theorists have flocked to rights discourse, many conservative theorists have unconsciously (or consciously) fled. But in so doing, they may tacitly affirm a procedural priority to political discourse over moral discourse. What is more, they leave undone the moral discourse that issues from principles and proceeds by arguments (and not mere allergy). The prudent move, insofar as embodied persons are capable of it, must be to rise above the limitations of the immanent political by appeal to the transcendent moral in recognition of a possible good that impinges upon us all.

Rights Talk Beyond Mere Politics

Take, for example, the question of environmental rights. Traditionally, we wouldn’t attribute rights to nonpersons. Environmental rights, if they describe anything, describe how a person and a society ought to comport themselves in their environment given the goodness of God’s creation, the limitations of human dominion, and the relative scarcity of available resources. Many of our secular contemporaries would formulate their position somewhat differently. At times, the utter lack of nuance is enough to send one running in the opposite direction. And many have done just that, retaining only enough of a recent encyclical to pronounce upon their carbon footprint as either “Laudato Si’” or “Laudato No.” And yet, while we may care less about eco-justice than about Christological orthodoxy, we still care about it. And though some of our contemporaries may care a lot more about eco-justice than about Christological orthodoxy, nevertheless our common care is a point of contact. And it may be the way of bridging our secular contemporaries to Christological orthodoxy. By leading the discourse and guiding the conversation, we can conduct those who might not otherwise interest themselves in ecclesial life through the pursuit of an integral human ecology.

Catholic social teaching is the setting in which to host these types of conversations. For years, Catholic social teaching has been largely the domain of liberals. Many conservatives have shied away from the discourse for reasons of political allergy or perhaps by a prudential judgment that it wasn’t worth wading through the literature when one’s time could be spent more profitably or expeditiously elsewhere. I have experienced this aversion myself.

I understand that Catholic social teaching is a frustrating discipline. Its preoccupation with positive precepts and apparently hortatory nature makes it feel less like science and more like parenesis. When compared to the Church’s sexual teaching, which traffics quite often in negative precepts and offers clearer scientific explanations, Catholic social teaching can feel unserious. But to avoid Catholic social teaching at this juncture would be a mistake. Now more than ever, we need to recover moral discourse and practice within a setting in which we can hope to meet our secular contemporaries as they experience their moral reality.

The work as outlined can be genuinely evangelical and not just vacuously ecumenical. The recovery of rights needn’t culminate in a mutual expression of respectful esteem. It ought to culminate in Baptism. To this end, a Catholic theologian ought to recover rights in a way that is genuinely mystagogical.

Consider, for instance, where rights fit within Catholic social teaching. Lists of the most important principles of Catholic social teaching vary, but when pressed to choose four, the Church typically responds with (1) the dignity of the human person, (2) the common good, (3) subsidiarity, and (4) solidarity. It’s when allowed to enumerate further principles that the Church typically adds human rights.

Human rights fit within a vision of life that draws on the power of these principles in their communal realization. Human rights flow from the dignity of the human person, a doctrine that the West truly and fully learned from the Church. So too, human rights flow into the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity, fostering a vision of a society constituted by cooperative agency and ordered to a hierarchy of goods with God at the summit. The Church is well situated to exposit this teaching and give an account for which the world is quite literally dying. At the end of the day, only the Church can be relied upon to champion these principles and advance a discourse and practice in which man’s integral flourishing is prized. For, while there remains a natural integrity to the doctrine of subjective rights, the persistent misuse of the past centuries has left many persons speculatively numb to the claims and practically unable to effect the recovery for themselves.

I see this task as pertaining to the office of Christian instruction or what might be specified further as teaching and preaching. In Summa theologiae III, q. 71, a. 4, ad 3, in an article dedicated to prebaptismal catechesis, St. Thomas outlines what he understands to be four kinds of instruction. The first he refers to as converting to the faith. We can call this apologetic and kerygmatic preaching. St. Thomas says that this pertains to bishops, but he concedes that it can pertain to any preacher, indeed, any faithful person. The second he refers to as that by which someone is instructed in the rudiments of the faith and especially in what one ought to have for receiving the sacraments. We can call this catechetical preaching. This, he says, pertains to the ministers, thinking especially of priests but also of deacons and those in minor orders. The third he refers to as concerning the conversation (or comportment) of Christian life. We can call this moral preaching. This, he says, pertains to sponsors or godparents, thinking, of course, of parents as well. The fourth and final concerns the profound mysteries of the faith and the perfection of Christian life. We can call this mystagogical preaching or even holy preaching. St. Thomas says this pertains to bishops, but he would have probably understood the Dominican Order to have a share in this grace.

The recovery of rights talk within the setting of Catholic social teaching pertains squarely to Christian instruction, and I think we can see elements of all four modes of teaching and preaching at work in the task. To those who would trot out past corporate abuses like the Inquisition and the Crusades as evidence of the Church’s inefficacy and malignancy, we can advance an apology of her as a defender of rights even as we proclaim a Christ who came to bestow upon us far more than our due. For those lacking the vocabulary and grammar to enunciate their commitment to human dignity, we can furnish them with a biblical and traditional catechesis as to the image of God, which Christ came to restore and perfect. For those bewildered by behavioral incoherence, we can show them the way of a moral life in which each person assumes his proper place and plays his proper role in service of a common good more personal than his private good. And to those who think only of social and political solutions for their intractable problems, we can direct their gaze beyond strategy to salvation and to the promise of perfected agency in communion with the God who goes before us and awaits at the end.

If done well, the recovery of rights ought to facilitate an encounter between our secular contemporaries and the dignity of their human estate, for the recovery of which God himself was willing to die. In that revelation of God’s life and the accompanying mediation of grace, we have abundant resources for our social and political aims, even as we pursue a goal that lies far beyond them, a goal that ranges all the way to God. So, while rights talk might not fit in every publication (depending upon its size and scope), it ought to fit in the Church’s publication of the Gospel for love of our fellow man.

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