In 1921, Pope Benedict XV’s encyclical In praeclara summorum presented Dante as the “disciple of Saint Thomas Aquinas” and celebrated his Commedia for containing a “treasure of Catholic teaching.” In 1934, by contrast, the French historian Étienne Gilson accused Dante of two crimes against Aquinas—shattering Christian wisdom and ruining Christendom—and, thereby, of striking “a mortal blow” to Thomism. Is Dante, then, a Thomist, as the papal encyclical maintains, or a murderer of Thomism, as Gilson alleges? In this article, I first chart Pope Leo XIII’s promotion of “Dante the Thomist,” which led, in due course, to the papal encyclical of 1921. Second, I defend Dante from Gilson’s accusations, arguing that Gilson reframes and distorts both Aquinas’s and Dante’s thought. Third, I put Gilson himself in the dock, accusing him of two crimes against Aquinas: ruining Aquinas’s sophisticated discrimination between truths of faith and of reason through his misguided conception of “Christian philosophy,” and undermining a Thomistic understanding of the relationship between Church and State through his novel “Christian social philosophy.” Fourth, I turn to Dante’s own representation of Aquinas in the Commedia. I conclude with the hope that, correctly understood, Dante may become again under Pope Leo XIV—as he was under Pope Leo XIII—an invaluable ally in the remarkable renewal of Thomistic philosophy and theology that we are witnessing again today.

Dante the Thomist

Over the twenty-five years of his papacy (from 1878 to 1903), Pope Leo XIII made repeated references to Dante in his speeches and works, and sought to promote the study and the Catholic reception of Dante.1 Having created a special chair in Dante studies for the clerical scholar Giacomo Poletto (1840–1914) at the Pontifical University of Apollinaire in Rome (now the Lateran), Pope Leo XIII gave Poletto the specific responsibility to analyze Dante’s thought in a Thomist key.2 Poletto would go on to produce the Dizionario dantesco in eight volumes (with innumerable cross-references to Aquinas’s Summa theologiae) and a three-volume commentary on the Commedia.3 Likewise, the Dominican scholar Joachim Berthier (1848–1924) dedicated his “scholastic commentary” on the Inferno to Pope Leo XIII, whom he refers to as the “eminent patron of Thomistic and Dante studies,” inserting, on its title page, an image of St. Thomas in his teaching chair with Dante standing next to him listening.4

Pope Leo XIII’s championing of Dante as a Catholic and a Thomist poet came at a time when he was, effectively, a “prisoner of the Vatican,” and when the nascent Italian state projected Dante as a model of “an anticlerical layman opposed to the power of the papacy” (as “cattolico ma non clericale”). Giuseppe Ferrari (1811–76), for example, defined Dante as “St. Thomas upside down.”5 In this context, Pope Leo XIII made three decisive interventions. First of all, in 1881 (just two years after Aeterni Patris), he removed Dante’s Monarchia from the Index of Prohibited Books (where it had remained since 1554).6 Second, he reappraised Dante’s distinction between spiritual and temporal power, each with its direct source in God, as in broad harmony with Aquinas’s political thought and with the Church’s understanding of the relationship between these powers, which he articulated anew in his encyclical Immortale Dei (1885). Third, Pope Leo XIII clearly distinguished Dante’s reverence for the seat and office of St. Peter from his personal invectives against individual popes. While acknowledging that, driven “by the anger and bitterness of exile” and by a “partisan spirit,” Dante “sometimes erred in his judgements,” Pope Leo XIII nonetheless insisted, therefore, that Dante was “never of a mind opposed to the truths of Christian wisdom,” and honored him as a “splendid ornament” of Christianity.

Published on the sixth centenary of Dante’s death in 1921, Pope Benedict XV’s encyclical In praeclara summorum officially canonized this vision of “Dante the Thomist”:

Dante ranged himself as disciple of that Prince of the school so distinguished for angelic temper of intellect, Saint Thomas Aquinas. From him he gained nearly all his philosophical and theological knowledge.7

In the 1920s, this position was further defended, for example, by the Theologian of the Papal Household Mariano Cordovani in articles such as “St. Thomas and Dante” (1921) and “Dante’s Thomism” (1928).8

Over the course of the twentieth century, however, this view of Dante’s doctrine as in substantial alignment with that of St. Thomas—of the “Thomist Dante”—would come to be dispelled as a “myth” or “legend”9 and, by the century’s close, would be apparently “put to rest.” And even those close to the Church’s magisterium, it seems, have acquiesced more recently to this scholarly consensus. While on the seventh centenary of Dante’s birth, Pope Paul VI’s Altissimi cantus (1965) continued to sustain the Church’s “Thomist Dante” interpretive position (“Dante Alighieri is a firm and faithful disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas”), on the seventh centenary of Dante’s death, Pope Francis’s apostolic letter Candor lucis aeternae (2021) quietly abandoned it, Aquinas conspicuous only by his absence (he is not mentioned at all).10

The reasons for this reversal are manifold and complex, but I will focus on one of two scholars (and exact contemporaries) particularly responsible for the rejection of the Leonine “Thomist Dante” position. Of the two, perhaps the more obvious choice would be Bruno Nardi (1884–1968): his was, in the words of the English Dominican Kenelm Foster, a “lifelong effort to detach Dante from Aquinas,” and he openly sought, in his own words, to “break down the myth of the Thomist Dante, stealing water from the Thomistic watermill of traditional commentators.”11 However, I will focus, instead, on Étienne Gilson (1884–1978); his influence, I believe, was more profound, in that he reframed not just the twentieth-century understanding of Dante’s thought but of Aquinas’s thought as well.

The Crimes of Dante

In 1934, Gilson—then aged fifty—published a short essay entitled “Le crime de Dante”:

The crime of Dante—because it is one—was to ruin both the unity of Christian wisdom, by isolating faith from reason, and the unity of Christendom, by isolating from the spiritual order the temporal order (which should be subordinated to it). The greatness of the poet is not in question, but he was not the poet of Christendom.12

In 1939, Gilson would develop this thesis in his full-length monograph Dante et la philosophie:

Just as he split mediaeval Christendom into two camps, Dante also completely shatters the unity of Christian wisdom, the unifying principle and the bond of Christendom. In each of these vital matters this alleged Thomist struck a mortal blow at the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas.13

According to Gilson, Dante’s crime was twofold: in the political sphere, he destroyed the unity of Christendom and, in the intellectual sphere, he destroyed the unity of Christian wisdom. One could hardly imagine a more radically opposed view of Dante to that promoted by Pope Leo XIII and articulated in Pope Benedict XV’s encyclical In praeclara summorum just a decade earlier. For Gilson, Dante, a great poet, is emphatically not the poet of Christendom, but directly instrumental to its ruin; he is not a Thomist, as alleged, but rather he struck Thomism a mortal blow.

As I discovered, Gilson’s view is best appreciated as a programmatic departure from the clerical historian Martin Grabmann’s (1875–1949) understanding of Aquinas’s and Dante’s political thought.14 In his monograph Studies on the Influence of Aristotelian Philosophy on Medieval Theories of the Relationship between Church and State (1934), Grabmann analyzes three different ways in which thirteenth-century scholars related Aristotelian philosophy to Christian theology, and how these led, in turn, to competing medieval theories about the relationship between Church and State.15

Grabmann takes Aquinas as a representative proponent of “Christian Aristotelianism” (which he also labels “Thomistic harmony”). Philosophy “has its own sphere of work, its own principles, and its own method” and is subordinated, as handmaid, to theology only insofar as the “truths of divine revelation and faith are concerned.”16 Likewise, secular authority “possesses far-reaching autonomy in its own domain” and “is subject to ecclesiastical authority only insofar as the concerns and requirements of the supernatural final end—eternal life—are involved.” Aquinas’s “particular achievement,” on Grabmann’s view, was an organic development of Augustine’s City of God combined with a reappropriation of Aristotelian social and political theory. This made possible a philosophical theory of the state in its own sphere, while also providing the principles for a balanced relationship between Church and State. The so-called doctrine of “ecclesiastical potestas indirecta in temporalibus” militated against exaggerated hierocratic claims of the papacy, on the one hand, and against the obstruction by the State of man’s pursuit of his supernatural end, on the other.17

Grabmann takes William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua (Defensor pacis) as representative examples of the second doctrine of Latin Averroism. In the speculative realm, Grabmann associates this with the radical independence of philosophy from theology, even to the extreme of postulating a “double truth,” whereby something can be true according to the faith, but false according to philosophy. In the political sphere, Grabmann associates Latin Averroism with rejecting “any dependence of secular power on spiritual power” and teaching “a complete subordination of spiritual, papal power under secular power.”18 Grabmann underlines “the significant difference that exists here between the use of Aristotle by Marsilius of Padua on the one hand, and by Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Dante on the other”—the former a “constitutional technique,” the latter the “objective natural-law element in Aristotle’s conception.”19 For Grabmann, then, it is Ockham and Marsilius who “threw the world into turmoil” while, in this respect, Dante is in the same camp as Aquinas.20

Grabmann sees Guido Vernani as a “noteworthy example” of an advocate of the third doctrine of “Augustinian subordination,” of the direct subordination of philosophy to theology, and of the State to the Church: the Pope’s potestas directa in temporalibus.21 The author of De potestate summi pontificis, a commentary on Pope Boniface VIII’s Unam sanctam (1302), Vernani is known to Dante scholars, as Grabmann notes, principally on account of his polemical refutation of Dante’s Monarchia. In De reprobatione Monarchiae, indeed, Vernani rejects Dante’s core idea of a double happiness: “one being a beatitudo politica, a happiness achievable in this life within the state, and the other, a transcendent happiness in the vision and enjoyment of the highest divine truth and goodness.”22 Instead, and drawing on Augustine and on Aquinas, Vernani argues that each individual, and the community as a whole, has only one end: the supernatural beatific vision in which alone “the human heart can find its rest.”23 As Grabmann demonstrates, however, Vernani “does not display the same nuanced understanding of the fines medii (intermediate ends) as does Thomas,” for “Aquinas shows the ways in which, within the framework of this ultimate goal and ordered toward it, a beatitudo politica—although Aquinas does not use this exact expression—can still be achieved through the governing activity of the ruler.”24

For Grabmann, therefore, Dante (like Aquinas) is a proponent of the first doctrine: the indirect power of the Pope in temporal matters. Despite his imperial utopianism and his opposition to the papacy’s temporal power and wealth, Dante nonetheless clearly acknowledges both (1) the necessity of a temporal and a spiritual power, responsible for man’s mortal and immortal happiness and (2) a hierarchy of submission, in virtue of the natural end being ordered to the supernatural end.25 As Giacomo Poletto argued, Dante’s Monarchia (taken off the Index of Prohibited Books in 1881) is, at least in this respect, in harmony with the doctrine of Aquinas and of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Immortale Dei of 1885.26

Let us now see how Gilson reframes and distorts Grabmann’s three conceptions of the relationship between Church and State. Gilson first argues that the distinction between the Pope’s direct and indirect power in temporalibus is, in effect, illusory: it “seems inappropriate to us,” Gilson opines, “to describe the Church’s authority over the temporal order as ‘indirect.’”27 Instead, the Pope exercises:

direct action on politics, like grace on nature and faith on reason. And as this action upon the temporal order can only be exercised in the temporal order, politics of the Church must exist, conducted in the world by the Church in the person of the Supreme Pontiff, effectively acting as sovereign.28

Having collapsed Grabmann’s first conception altogether, Gilson associates Dante with Grabmann’s second conception, making him the principal representative of a heterodox Latin Averroism in the political sphere: it is “precisely Dante who broke the unity of this Christian wisdom, professing the path of a ‘rupture of Christendom,’ along which Ockham and Marsilius of Padua would later proceed.”29

Gilson then argues that Aquinas’s conception has been misinterpreted and that, practically, it implies that the Pope has direct and not indirect power over both the spiritual and temporal realms. Aquinas thus becomes, for Gilson, a champion of the “hierocratic system,” and of the “doctrine of the papal potestas directa in temporalibus.”30 To achieve this reversal, Gilson adopts an absolute interpretation of Aquinas’s subordination of royal to priestly authority in De regimine principum, which Grabmann, while acknowledging, had explicitly rejected (for a series of arguments with which Gilson does not engage), and he interprets another problematic passage (which he claims other scholars “often forget”) straightforwardly to confirm his hierocratic thesis, despite Grabmann having addressed this difficulty directly, and noted that it had been “recognised by all those who have engaged with St. Thomas’s doctrine of the relationship between Church and State.”31

By collapsing the first position altogether, and by associating Dante with the second and Aquinas with the third position, Gilson is left with two mutually opposed conceptions of the relationship between Church and State: the clerical hierocratic position (identified now with Aquinas) and the radical Averroist position of mutual independence (identified now with Dante):

The doctrinal gulf that divides the champions of the Pope’s temporal supremacy and their opponents is not fixed between Roger Bacon and Thomas Aquinas, but between Thomas Aquinas and Dante.32

In Gilson’s striking parallelism, Aquinas thereby moves—in the political sphere—from being (like Dante) an opponent of the Pope’s direct temporal supremacy to being (like Roger Bacon) its very champion.

Gilson presents Dante’s Monarchia, indeed, as an antithesis to Aquinas’s De regimine principum. As his “conclusive proof,” Gilson presents two incomplete statements—one from Dante and one from Aquinas—alongside each other:

For the Sovereign Pontiff, vicar of Our Lord Jesus Christ and Peter’s successor, to whom we owe what is the due, not to Christ, but to Peter. (Dante, Mon. 3.3.7)
The highest priest, the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom it is necessary that all kings of the Christian people be subject just as to our Lord Jesus Christ. (Aquinas, De reg. princ. 1.14)

Gilson comments that here Dante and St. Thomas “have expressed the essence of their positions,” which “flagrantly contradict each other . . . in almost word-by-word opposition.”33 Following only Gilson’s presentation, it would be difficult to disagree with him. But, yet again, Gilson’s presentation is deeply misleading, as becomes clear when one reads Aquinas’s statement in context:

So that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly things, the ministry of this kingdom [that is, of the heavenly kingdom] was committed not to earthly kings, but to priests, and especially to the highest priest, the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom it is necessary that all kings of the Christian people be subject just as to our Lord Jesus Christ.

Gilson also neglects to mention that Grabmann glosses these very lines of Aquinas (in their proper context) in terms of Aquinas’s doctrine of the two ends, and of the Pope’s potestas indirecta in temporalibus.34 In the Christian era, there are two kingdoms—of this world and of the next—corresponding to the two ultimate ends (natural and supernatural). The “kings of the Christian people” are sovereign in their own domain, and subject to the Pope only in those things which regard man’s supernatural end.

Gilson postulates as “a historically verifiable philosophical law” that “the manner in which one conceives the relationship of the State to the Church, that in which one conceives the relationship of philosophy to theology, and that in which one conceives the relationship of nature to grace, are necessarily correlated.”35 While this postulate (which Gilson, again, derives from Grabmann) is arguably valid, it follows that a misunderstanding of Aquinas’s or Dante’s conception of one relationship leads to a misunderstanding of their conception of the others. The “doctrinal gulf” which Gilson identifies between Aquinas’s and Dante’s understanding of the relationship between Church and State depends, as we have seen, on his radical reframing of Grabmann’s thesis—according to which, Aquinas and Dante are alike Christian Aristotelians—such that Dante becomes, instead, a champion of Latin Averroism, while Aquinas becomes, instead, the champion of Augustinian subordination.

The Crimes of Gilson

Is it right, then, to speak of the “crime or the crimes of Dante” against Thomism, as Gilson alleged, or might we more appropriately speak of the “crime or the crimes of Gilson” against Thomism? Having defended Dante against the two crimes that Gilson imputed to him—shattering Christian wisdom and ruining the unity of Christendom—let me now put Gilson himself in the dock and charge him with two crimes against Thomism.

Gilson’s first crime, in the intellectual sphere, was to distort Aquinas’s sophisticated discrimination between truths of faith and of reason, and to undermine, thereby, the very nature of Catholic philosophy. For Gilson, the Christian faith had a material effect on philosophy not only in the order of discovery (as his opponents would allow) but in the order of demonstration: “Christian theologians,” including Aquinas, “had created a philosophy that was Christian both in its form and in its content”; their “philosophy,” in other words, was objectively dependent on Christian faith. For Dominicans such as Pierre Mandonnet and Antonin-Gilbert Sertillanges, Gilson’s historical recovery of (and advocacy for) such a “Christian philosophy” was a retrograde step to the state of medieval thought prior to Aquinas, with its characteristic confusion between theology and philosophy. Mandonnet berated Gilson for transporting the theological order into philosophy, and situating Aquinas’s philosophy as effectively internal to, and dependent upon, his theology.36 Likewise, for Fernand van Steenberghen, it was precisely “the tendency, under the name of ‘Christian philosophy,’ to mix up things important to distinguish carefully” which led to the severe detriment of both philosophy and theology, and to heterodoxy in Gilson’s own writings:

Today still, many Catholic philosophers, deformed by theology, do not succeed in imposing on themselves a strictly philosophical method. And then again, theologians, poorly informed about the precise signification of philosophical conclusions, make an unfortunate use of them in their interpretation of the revealed datum. We suffer much more from the confusion of philosophy and theology than from their isolation.37

While, for Gilson, Dante’s first crime was precisely “to ruin the unity of Christian wisdom, by isolating faith from reason,” Gilson’s first crime, on this view, was precisely to confuse faith and reason, and to ruin, thereby, the hard-fought-for relative autonomy of Thomistic philosophy.

Gilson’s second crime, in the political sphere, was to distort Aquinas’s understanding of the relationship between Church and State, and to undermine also, thereby, a Thomistic political philosophy. In 1933, Gilson gave a series of lectures on “Christian Social Philosophy” in Toronto, in which he set out the sketch of what, in due course, would become The Metamorphoses of the City of God (1952).38 According to Gilson, the “peculiar genius” of the medieval Franciscan theologian Roger Bacon (ca. 1214–94) gave expression in the political sphere to the “secret” aspirations of “pure theologians” such as Aquinas:

Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Duns Scotus spoke admirably about Christian wisdom. All more or less felt that Christian wisdom secretly aspired to create a new people that would live upon the substance of wisdom, even in time, but Roger Bacon is the only one who saw it, the only one who received the personal mission of saying it and who did say it . . . the Respublica Fidelium of which Roger Bacon speaks so well, which we ordinarily call Christendom, must be acknowledged, described, defined, and integrated into its place in the concept of the Church.39

The “first blatant and hardly disputable metamorphosis” of St. Augustine’s “concept of the City of God,” this republic of Christian believers, if not of this world, is still in this world and, not only as the Church Militant, but as “a true temporal people.”40 Claiming that “a universalism of reason capable of replacing faith has not been found . . . even where reason divides, faith unites,” Gilson dismissed a philosophical theory of the state tout court insofar as it is “neutral,” “its very secularity grounds its universality,” and “all humans are called to be part of it without distinction of race or religion.” Instead, Gilson envisaged a renewed Christendom as a united, distinctively Christian political body, over which the Pope would have, in effect, direct power in spiritual and in temporal matters.41 While, for Gilson, Dante was guilty of separating Church and State, and thus of shattering the unity of Christendom, Gilson’s crime, on this view, was precisely to confuse the domains of Church and State, and to undermine, thereby, the Thomistic via media of potestas indirecta in temporalibus which Pope Leo XIII had articulated anew in Immortale Dei (1885).

What I have called the crimes of Gilson exerted an enormous influence on twentieth-century Thomist scholarship and Dante studies. Taking just Gilson’s conception of “Christian philosophy,” allow me to give a Dominican example of its influence in each of these two fields.

In Thomistic studies, the French Dominican Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895–1990) came to see Gilson’s Le Thomisme as “the working tool of his whole generation.” According to Chenu, Gilson understood well “that the philosophy of Saint Thomas was internal to his theology . . . we were always on the same path.”42 In the 1920s, Chenu advocated for Gilson’s closer involvement at the French Dominican House of Studies at Le Saulchoir, and, once appointed Regent of Studies in 1934, he pursued a clearly Gilsonian agenda, directing its studies toward the history of “primitive Thomism,” and away from scholastic or speculative theology. For Gilson, after all, “ever since the thirteenth century, which was the century of Saint Thomas Himself. . . , the true meaning of the philosophy of Saint Thomas had been lost,” and he located this evil especially “at the beginning of the twentieth century, in Western Europe, in the teaching of Catholic schools and among scholastics who considered themselves Thomists.”43 On the feast day of St. Thomas in 1936, Chenu echoed Gilson’s attack on the teaching of neo-scholastic philosophy and theology, and developed Gilson’s “novel” formulation of Christian philosophy into a new Dominican school of theology: Une école de théologie: Le Saulchoir (published in 1937). This further entrenched a confused internalization of philosophy within theology, which became a feature of the so-called nouvelle théologie and of much subsequent Catholic thought.

In Dante studies, the English Dominican Kenelm Foster (1910–79) uncritically adopted Gilson’s conviction that Aquinas developed a new, distinctively Christian philosophy as the very premise for his doctoral thesis.44 Throughout his scholarly career, Foster explicitly situated his approach to Dante in opposition to the Dominicans Mandonnet, Cordovani, and the lay Dominican Edward Bullough (who had first introduced him to Dante at Cambridge), and as following the “pioneering labours of Bruno Nardi and Gilson’s brilliant book [Dante et la philosophie].”45 Just as Gilson considered Dante a Latin Averroist and a “pure philosopher,” so Foster’s core claim was that there were Two Dantes (the title of his seminal collection of essays of 1977): that is, Dante was caught between being a humanist (a lover of poetry and a philosopher) and a Christian (a lover of God and a theologian). Just as Gilson identified as “the crime of Dante to ruin the unity of Christian wisdom, by isolating faith from reason,” so Foster saw the dichotomy between Dante’s two guides—Virgil and Beatrice—as creating a problematic separation in the Commedia between nature and grace, reason and faith, and philosophy and theology.

What Gilson (and Foster following him) considered as “the crime of Dante,” or the “evil” of “scholastics who call themselves Thomists,” is arguably, however, just Thomism properly understood. After all, if, on Foster’s reckoning, there are “Two Dantes,” there are also, by the same logic, “Two Aquinases”: namely, Aquinas, the philosopher (author, for example, of long philosophical commentaries on Aristotle) and Aquinas, the theologian (author of the Summa theologiae and other theological works). Likewise, Dante’s two guides—Virgil and Beatrice—are, from a traditional Thomistic perspective, simply his poetic solution to the challenge of representing, in the speculative order of knowledge, the relative autonomy of truths from reason and from revelation, truths which find—in Christian theology (in Aquinas’s Summa theologiae as in Dante’s Commedia)—their integration, without thereby losing their distinction. It was, nonetheless, Gilson’s understanding of Dante and Aquinas (especially as mediated by Foster) that would form the scholarly consensus by the late twentieth century, consolidated as it was by Foster’s authorship of some of the “most substantial and important” articles of the Enciclopedia dantesca (1970–78), on “Theology,” “God,” “Christ,” “the Gospel,” and on “Aquinas” himself.46

Dante’s St. Thomas

As Cordovani wryly remarked as early as 1921, if a few lines of praise devoted to Siger of Brabant could lead (in his view mistakenly) to the attribution of “a great baggage of Averroistic theories to our poet,” what must we say of the three entire cantos of Paradiso “full of the glory of Thomas Aquinas and in which he holds the truly sovereign place?”47 The obvious interpretation of Dante’s literary and, at an imaginative level, visual privileging of Aquinas in the heaven of the sun—making him “the leader of the first crown of theologians” and endowing him with “a marvellous lesson in the scientific method and in prudence for the discernment of truth in the fields of philosophy and theology”—is “to signify the brilliance of his wisdom.”48 Indeed, to no other character in the Commedia, aside from its three central protagonists (Dante, Virgil, and Beatrice), does Dante afford as many verses as to St. Thomas Aquinas.

In the concluding simile with which Aquinas finally departs the scene, moreover, Dante seems to imply the perfect correspondence between Aquinas’s doctrine and supernatural truth itself.49 Adopting a homely image—the concentric ripples of water created in a round bowl between the outer rim and the center (when the water is struck from outside) or from the center to the outer rim (when, like the thought that drops into Dante’s mind, a pebble is dropped into its center)—Dante describes the perfect likeness between the speech of Aquinas (who is situated in the circumference of the first circle of the wise) and the speech of Beatrice (who is situated, with Dante, at its central point).

Dal centro al cerchio, e sì dal cerchio al centroMovesi l’acqua in un ritondo vasoSecondo ch’è percosso fuori o dentroNella mia mente fe’ subito casoQuesto ch’io dico, sì come si tacqueLa gloriosa vita di Tommaso,Per la similitudine che nacqueDel suo parlar e di quel di Beatrice (Par. 14.1–8)
[From centre to circumference, or else from circumference to centre, the water moves in a round container according as it is struck without or within:into my mind suddenly dropped what I have just said, as soon as the glorious life of St. Thomas fell silent,Because of the likeness that was born from his speech and that of Beatrice.]

While seeking in Dante et la philosophie (1939) to unpick Mandonnet’s arguments for Dante’s Thomism in Dante le théologien (1935) one by one, even Gilson recognized that this passage, “at first appears,” a “quite decisive” argument in “support of the fundamental Thomism of Dante . . . establishing that Dante considered Thomistic theology and faith to be hardly distinguishable.”

Gilson nonetheless goes on to claim that even this argument for Dante’s Thomism is “fantastic,” “utterly irrelevant,” “incoherent,” and “built on sand.”50 In doing so, Gilson falsely purported to put these verses “back in their context,” and “to restore” Dante and Beatrice “to the positions which Dante allotted to them at the beginning of Paradiso 14.” Mandonnet, however, had already stated clearly that “Beatrice occupies the centre and, in the crown which immediately surrounds her, St. Thomas occupies the pre-eminent place.”51 Mandonnet did not deny the literal significance of the analogy (as Gilson misleadingly implies) but rather gave it, in addition, a symbolical interpretation, which is also the majority reading of these verses in the early commentary tradition.52 A final response to Gilson’s critique may be that Dante probably derived this very image from his reading of Aquinas’s commentary on De anima, one of the most disputed philosophical texts of the time (not least, with respect to the Averroist view on the unicity of the potential intellect).53 Nothing would be more fitting (conveniens), perhaps, than that Dante might thus have taken a simile from his study of Aquinas’s philosophy to illustrate the perfect relationship between Aquinas’s doctrine and supernatural truth.

In his encyclical Aeterni Patris of 1879, Pope Leo XIII exhorted his bishops across the world “in all earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defence and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantages of all sciences”; “let the universities already founded or to be founded by you . . . illustrate and defend this doctrine, and use it for the refutation of prevailing errors.”54 And yet Pope Leo XIII also issued a warning:

But, lest the false for the true or the corrupt for the pure be drunk in, be ye watchful that the doctrine of Thomas be drawn from his own fountains, or at least from those rivulets which, derived from the very fount, have thus far flowed, according to the established agreement of learned men, pure and clear; be careful to guard the minds of youth from those which are said to flow thence, but in reality are gathered from strange and unwholesome streams.55

In this article, I have argued that one such “strange and unwholesome stream” is, at least in two core respects, the deeply influential Thomism of Étienne Gilson. I have accused Gilson, indeed, of two crimes against Thomism—his novel “Christian philosophy” and “Christian social philosophy”—crimes that, in turn, led him to falsely accuse Dante of shattering both Christian wisdom and the unity of Christendom.

Retrieving the “established agreement of learned men” of the Leonine Thomistic revival, I have argued, instead, that Dante’s works, and preeminently the Commedia, are a true “rivulet” of the doctrine of Thomas. Purified and restored anew, I hope that many may find again in Dante’s Commedia, in the words of In praeclara summorum, a “treasure of Catholic teaching,” the “essence of Christian philosophy and theology,” and, even, “the compendium of the divine laws which should govern the constitution and administration of States.”56 As Pope Benedict XV exhorted at the conclusion of his encyclical: “the more you grow in love for [Dante], the more perfectly your souls will be irradiated by the splendour of truth, and the more steadfast you will remain in your devotion and service to the holy faith.” With an American pope, Leo XIV (who, in taking that name, explicitly looked back to Pope Leo XIII), I hope that—by likewise looking back for inspiration to the remarkable scholarly era ushered in by Pope Leo XIII—we may witness, in the coming quarter century, not only a second Leonine renaissance of Thomism but also a second Leonine renaissance of Dante studies as well.

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