When we assign any thinker a place in history, we are also simultaneously, even if implicitly, making a claim about that history itself. Beyond inert admissions that a certain thinker is highly intelligent or original, we are also stating whether they are illustrative and foundational for a stream of intellectual history, or an aberration from and sad ending thereof. That John Calvin is a genius is beyond dispute. Whether he is the greatest Christian thinker since Augustine, and the one to systematize his thoughts and return them to the purity of the Gospel, or someone who exaggerates and distorts a single insight in order to produce a monstrous view of God that renders Christianity intellectually and morally unpalatable, is, to be sure, the matter of some dispute. Likewise with philosophy: Does Martin Heidegger return philosophy to its pre-Socratic glory by eschewing onto-theology, or does his thought castrate philosophy by restricting its full ambit? When assessing any figure, whether canonizing them or anathematizing them, we should always ask ourselves about the hidden presumptions about who counts as a hero and who a villain in the tradition under consideration.
The Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) has been hailed as perhaps the greatest theologian of the 20th century, something akin to a modern church father, as well as held in suspicion as perhaps a heretic or very nearly one. For some, he belongs in the company of Augustine and Aquinas, whereas for others he is named alongside Arius and Apollinaris. For those accustomed to looking for portents and signs, Balthasar’s death provides ample evidence for both interpretations: He died shortly after being named a cardinal by Pope John Paul II, sealing his theological career with a papal blessing. The rejoinder: Yes, but God will not be mocked. Balthasar died suddenly two days before the consistory, thus never receiving the red hat. Similarly, regarding his relationship to the mystic Adrienne von Speyr: Perhaps their collaboration indicates a heavenly ratification of his theological mission, or, if her extraordinary claims are held in suspicion, it reveals a deception and a delusion at the root of his speculations.
I will not here attempt to divine the hidden meanings behind these supposed signs, nor to sort out his status as a cardinal or his relationship with von Speyr. Instead, I will deal directly with his “style” of theology, which has also come under perhaps the most sustained criticism. For many of his detractors, and indeed even for some of his admirers, Balthasar is seen as simply too idiosyncratic of a thinker to be a model for others. Whatever acts of deference need be made to his towering intellect, he has shown himself to be incapable of providing an adequate replacement for the tradition of scholasticism that he and his friends never tired of critiquing. In other words, if a broadly “ressourcement” style of theology initially won the day, this was due to the undisputed fecundity of a host of discrete individuals: Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, Louis Bouyer, Balthasar, and many others. It was a “heroic generation” of theologians, but this heroism was not a heritable trait, and their genius was no basis upon which to found a stable tradition of theological writing and pedagogy.1 Whereas the old, constantly derided, theological manuals existed precisely for the education of priests in a common, intellectually comprehensible (and thus often tending towards the simplistic and historically innocent) tradition, this new generation does not and cannot serve this basic function of theological pedagogy. One would only assign Balthasar to first-year seminarians as penance, and de Lubac is often best reserved for the doctoral seminar.
This generation thus laid waste to the scholastic training they received, but gave us nothing but their own brilliance in return. This brilliance, no matter how bright, cannot serve as a model for the theological task or provide the foundation for catechesis, seminary formation, or indeed higher theological studies. In the memorable conclusion to Karen Kilby’s book on Balthasar, she makes this point forcefully: “If there is much to learn from Balthasar, the one thing in my view one ought not to learn from him is how to be a theologian.”2 Indeed, the style of Balthasar is itself a claim about the task and the shape of the theological enterprise, and it is not, in her estimation, one that could be profitably imitated or emulated. When looking at theological history as a whole, Balthasar must be considered an exception, as slightly or massively out of place.
The question can be asked thus: Stipulating that we can speak meaningfully about a Catholic theological tradition, is a thinker like Balthasar emblematic and representative of that tradition or an aberration and departure from it? Again, the hidden presuppositions in many of these discussions are differing notions of what the theological tradition is or should be.
To speak of a theological “tradition,” one must have recourse to narrative. One must articulate the story of foundation, development, innovation, departure, self-correction, and corruption. Beyond a merely historical account, a theological articulation of tradition must discriminate between fidelity and betrayal, as well as nonculpable but still infelicitous expressions and nonmeritorious but still felicitous ones. Among the variety of ways of telling such a story of the Catholic theological tradition, we might suggest that the two principal modes could be called, for the sake of both simplicity and alliteration, the institutional and the idiosyncratic. After describing the former, I will propose that Balthasar is both an instance and defender of the latter. If Balthasar has often been misunderstood and his positions deemed dangerous to ecclesial life, this is, at least in part, because of the difficulty of locating him within the institutional narrative of tradition. To understand him aright, and to allow him to speak a word of advice to theology today, there is a need to first grasp the intelligibility of the idiosyncratic model of tradition.
One could very well tell the story of Catholic tradition in terms that prioritize the corporate and institutional over the individual and particular. And there are many advantages that come with this. In this view, what populates the expanse and flux of theological and magisterial history are not discrete individuals, but schools of thought, communities of monastics and scholars who have thought together in coherent intellectual communities. Divine Revelation is given to a people, and it is this people as a whole who receive it, pass it on, and contemplate its significance.
There are differing ways of speaking about this institutional continuity, which we might subdivide into the triumphalistic, the pluralistic, and the magisterial. For the first, theological tradition is a movement towards something very nearly like homogeneity, of content and of method. The various “schools” of theology in the early Church (whether Augustinian, Alexandrian, Cappadocian, or otherwise) find a more adequate system in the thought of, for instance, Thomas Aquinas or Bernard Lonergan, who then defines how theology as a science is to proceed going forward. The various gifts of an earlier theological pluralism are retained in a more adequate tradition of theological speculation, and theology thus gains for itself a solid ground from which it can proceed. This view need not be entirely obtuse to alternative theological schools, but it will only grant theological status to that which is recognizable within the parameters and method of the one true scientific mode of theology. Previous theologies might be seen as harbingers, but alternative accounts of the theological science are understood to be groping approximations of the proper mode of theological discourse, perhaps as alchemy prefigured modern science. Who needs the mercurial Augustine on his own terms when his best insights are captured and indeed elevated by the more dispassionate Aquinas?
Or, alternatively, one can maintain that the indisputable theological pluralism of the patristic period is maintained and continued through the Middle Ages and into today. Thus, instead of arguing that there is, or should be, only one school of thought, this allows a plurality of schools to exist in a fruitful tension with one another: Victorine, Thomistic, Franciscan, and perhaps even Balthasarian and Rahnerian are all allowed as permissible schools of thought. Any aspiring theologian would do well to choose one, to be formed in it deeply, and to operate according to the strictures and the logic of the chosen school of thought. If on certain material questions one school will ultimately triumph over another (for instance, Franciscans over Dominicans on the Immaculate Conception), the methods, the spiritual proclivities, and the overall styles of each school are to be maintained in perpetuity. If it is not immediately clear who has the right to found a new school, something like a “continuity of cult,” or rather a sustained intellectual heritage will prove itself retrospectively to have the rights of a new school of thought. “Thomism,” after all, endured a rather unpromising start with the local condemnation of some of Thomas’s ideas shortly after his death, but soon enough proved itself to have the “chronic vigor” (to borrow a term from Cardinal Newman) of a legitimate and profitable engine of theological inquiry.
As a third permutation, one can instead dispense almost entirely with notions of theological tradition and suggest that the only coherent or binding tradition is the magisterial one. It is the teaching of the Church in her official capacity that is the only true marker of intellectual continuity. Individual theologians are free to make proposals of all sorts, to suggest any possible rendition of how to comprehend Revelation, so long as it does not formally contradict previous magisterial documents. The Magisterium is then free to affirm or deny these various proposals, but the engine of thought is retained exclusively by this official body of the teaching of the Church. We could call this a kind of textual positivism, and previous generations have criticized this as a “Denzinger theology” (named after the collection of magisterial documents by Heinrich Denzinger). It is not the intention or the theological ambit or historical context of the writings of those magisterial statements that are of utmost importance, but the fact that they create a kind of legislative corpus that is universally normative.
In any case, all of these renditions of theological tradition look first at corporate bodies, at schools of thought. They will certainly recognize the importance of founding figures and representatives of the best of the tradition, whether an Augustine, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, or Leo XIII, but what is more significant than the individuals is the movements that they created or sustained. The viability of any thinker is then measured insofar as he or she makes a contribution to a diachronic conversation. True theological thinking is never a private soliloquy, but is always ecclesial, always at the service of the Church. It is the Church broadly, if not a specific theological school more locally, that elevates private thoughts into something to be emulated by others and taken as a pattern for faithful thinking. And is there not a kind of psychological validity to such an argument? Our thoughts are always shaped by the language and the customs and the mores of our predecessors, such that a true soliloquy, a private interior dialogue, seems to be an impossibility from the start. All thought, theological or otherwise, is “institutional” in at least this sense.
When tradition is understood in any of these more institutional senses, it is quite understandable that Balthasar would be held in some suspicion. Minimally, we can note that it is simply too soon to make a judgment about whether or not there will continue into the future a continuous school of Balthasarian thought. Certainly the journal he co-founded, Communio, has the best claim of representing this new school, but given the proximity of its founding, one could arguably still ask, with Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “Where is this new theology going?” That is not yet a question that can be answered with the kind of certainty that we might think we have when we consider more established schools of thought.
More incisively, and to recur to Kilby’s criticism, we can ask how such a singular thinker could ever be absorbed by any institution. Short of repeating and perhaps occasionally synthesizing the thought of the master, it is not obvious what future generations of Balthasarians are supposed to do. Are they to hew closely to all of his judgments and simply rehearse his ideas? If so, it is something closer to a fan club than to a genuine intellectual community. Are they all to become singular geniuses themselves, and thus come to their own judgments, their own styles? If so, in what way is this an identifiable tradition? Or are they to begin a kind of commentarial tradition, where further refinements to the thought of the master can be adjudicated? This is so far from the wishes of Balthasar (as we will see shortly) that it would be a kind of betrayal. With an exclusively institutional account of tradition, however implicit, it is somewhat expected that while a figure like Balthasar will be granted his rights as a luminary, he will also be considered an aberration from the theological tradition(s) of the past, and any discernible one going forward.
Before turning to an evaluation of Balthasar himself, we can give voice to his account of theological tradition, which differs considerably from the aforementioned. To be sure, we must note from the outset that what follows, in its important emphases, is not exclusive to Balthasar alone. He did not construct a theology of tradition in order to make room for himself. Instead, one could argue that this idiosyncratic view (still to be defined) is what has been held by most theologians in the past. Although, arguably, these institutional models have gained a kind of prominence in much theological discourse recently, they are harder to locate historically. One would search in vain in the corpus of Thomas Aquinas, for instance, for self-aware descriptions of his adherence to a Dominican theological tradition (although, to be sure, his being a Dominican shaped his thought to its roots). Likewise, he does not speak of alternative positions as rival schools. Rivals and opponents he most certainly has, but he typically names them as persons. If he opposes Bernard of Clairvaux on how to conceive of sacramental grace, he makes no mention of a Trappist theology writ large. Those who are reduced to their schools are, in large part, the philosophically confused or the theologically heterodox: the Averroists, the Nestorians, the “Greeks,” etc. Similarly with Augustine: He speaks of the Pelagians, not as a distinctive school of thought or mode of theology, but as those who adhere, no matter their broader theological methodology, spirituality, or style, to the blameworthy positions about grace first articulated by Pelagius. Lanfranc of Bec and Guitmund of Aversa will assuredly condemn the “Berengarians,” but this is reducible entirely to those who hold to Berengar of Tours’s understanding of the (spiritual instead of substantial) presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The same holds for the “Arians,” “Nestorians,” and “Monophysites”: The so-called “schools” here are simply those who hold to one particular theological position or another considered to be noxious to the Christian faith.
It is instructive that it is only in the 19th century that categories such as an “Alexandrian” or an “Antiochene” school of Christology will emerge to describe patristic Christological emphases, and the most recent scholarship has dismantled these labels to a considerable extent. What is true to history is the explicit emergence of distinct viae, ways of thought, beginning in the late 13th century. It is perhaps here that we could locate the beginning of the notion of theological “schools,” whereby one would identify oneself explicitly as part of “Thomism,” “Scotism,” “Albertism,” or the more generic division between those belonging to the via moderna or the via antiqua.3 Arguably it is principally in the universities of the later Middle Ages that notions of schools of thought begin to develop, not in the monasteries (St. Victor, Chartres) or regions (Alexandria, Cappadocia) that will later be categorized anachronistically as if they were something like these 14th- and 15th-century schools.
Without denying the importance of communities of thought, of institutions and friendships that can rightly be classified together, what I am calling the idiosyncratic model of tradition is the one that looks firstly to persons and their thought as irreducible to any wider network. If Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa are “Cappadocians” (which is a geographical, not intellectual description in the first instance), they are not reducible to or mere instances of a broader Cappadocian school of thought. Bonaventure and Scotus are not simply two luminaries of a “Franciscan School” that would be discernable apart from them. Or to put it more provocatively, there is no “Victorine School” apart from Hugh and Richard, and this so-called school only has any coherence, any intellectual gravitas, due to such figures. This is all the more the case with an Augustine in relationship to later Augustinianisms, or Thomas and various Thomisms.
To put the issue in another way: No school of thought is capable of producing its own luminaries simply by inducting new members. One cannot set up the method, the authorities, the principal questions, and then expect to generate a thinker like Bonaventure. The intellectual climate of 5th-century BC Athens does not, on its own, produce a thinker of the caliber and originality of Plato, no matter how much we must concede that certain climates are more or less favorable to such intellectual dynamism. By the time a “school of thought” emerges, we can acknowledge that this is often a sign of intellectual stagnation, at least when compared with the time of the founder. Or, if stagnation is too severe of a judgment, it is a sign of consolidation, of a time in which the teaching of the founder is digested and contemplated. Even then, and to state the matter more positively, all great participants in a school of thought do more than simply repeat (even when they claim that this is all they are doing) the thought of the master, but advance it in unexpected ways: Plotinus with regard to his master Plato; Maximus the Confessor to Gregory Nazianzen; Aquinas to both Augustine and Aristotle; Malebranche to Descartes. The oaths of fidelity and homage paid to the founder are always accompanied by extending certain lines, subtly correcting others, and by speaking for the founder on issues that he never seemed to have considered.
All of this is to say that, in this so-called idiosyncratic view of tradition, intellectual history is populated by persons more so than by institutions. These persons must be understood in their contexts, and there is an indisputable institutional element to the transmission of thought. One cannot understand the personal thought of Nicholas of Cusa without being intimately familiar with the reception of Pseudo-Dionysius, for instance. But in no way are the fecund ideas of Cusanus (God as Non-Other, Learned Ignorance, etc.) simply latent in the tradition of Dionysianism, waiting to be uncovered by any of his pupils. They arise in a person, who has, to be sure, sat at the feet of a master, but who also dares to imitate the master in thinking for himself about the mysteries of God in Christ. The great persons who populate intellectual history should, in this model, be considered as gifts, as unexacted, unmerited treasures for humanity as a whole. As true as that is for Aristotle and John of Damascus, so it is for Shakespeare and Dostoevsky. We know intuitively, especially in the case of the latter two, the impotence we would have in trying to establish institutions that would create such writers. Try we must, but even with the most polished curriculum, the arrival of a Borges or a Wordsworth would always come as a happy surprise.
Balthasar provides many different accounts of philosophical, theological, and literary history. The largest include his three-volume Apokalypse der deutschen Seele, two volumes of the first part of his Trilogy (The Glory of the Lord IV and V), and the first volume of the last part of the Trilogy (Theo-Drama I). Each of these, as well as many other shorter accounts, has a distinct purpose in mind. For instance, Glory of the Lord IV and V look particularly at the history of the question of aesthetics, but with an eye to the dance between philosophy, theology, and mythos that constitutes both ancient and modern thought, and Theo-Drama I is concerned with the history of drama in order to uncover dominant motifs that will then be structural for his theological proposals in later volumes. There is no need here to summarize these works, but we can simply note how often and to what extent Balthasar is concerned with a narration of intellectual traditions.
For our purposes, the essential thing is to note that Balthasar shows himself taken with those who have seen something of critical importance about the nature of the created order and the human condition (philosophers, novelists, poets) and about the contours of God’s self-revelation in Christ (theologians). He gravitates towards those who say something new because they have seen the same object in a new way, a deeper way. This is not to say that “creativity” is, in itself, a badge of honor that Balthasar bestows upon his favorite thinkers. He is not articulating a concept of tradition that is nothing more than a list of the most daring innovators. For all of his writings about other theologians (he has books on Origen of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor, Romano Guardini, Henri de Lubac, to name a few), Balthasar’s concern is always with the one object of thought that all these thinkers help him see anew: God. The same is true for the philosophers. If he is particularly influenced by Plotinus and Erich Przywara, or Aquinas and Ferdinand Ulrich, it is because they show something of the structure of being which is the object of philosophical inquiry. A student of many schools, Balthasar was a man of no school. The schools with their thinkers were for Balthasar so many ways of access to God and his creation.
In those few moments of explicit self-analysis, Balthasar also shows himself uninterested in considering himself to be a “founder” or to be involved in any kind of “movement.” Even regarding the journal Communio, Balthasar’s vision for the project was as an international community of friends and Christians who were undertaking a labor for the renewal of theology, the Church, and the wider culture, not as a means of propagating his own ideas.4 Rather, he viewed himself as a writer of “fragments” rather than a proponent of a new system, a new method that students could master and thus advance its cause. Despite the accusations of Balthasar as a kind of “panoptic” thinker, attempting to survey all knowledge so as to reduce it to his own particular vision, he repeatedly acknowledges the fragility and partiality of all thought, including his own. He did believe that truth could be communicated in history, that it could be expressed in language. But he was convinced that while truth is found in history, it is never reducible to its finite formulation. Truth remains beyond its propositional form even as the latter is a means of access to the former.
That is to say, one of Balthasar’s enduring commitments is that humanity can always say more, is in fact called to say more, about any given subject, particularly God. Even that which has been said, and said definitively and perhaps magisterially, can be said again and can be said otherwise. This is based not only on his understanding of the disproportion between description and object, but also on the nature of God as “ever-more,” a term he learned from his Jesuit training. Because it is God who has made himself known in Christ, the human response in theology is not that which renders God intelligible in the first instance. God has made himself intelligible, even as he can never be fully comprehended. As Augustine famously said: If you comprehend it, it is not God (si comprehendis, non est Deus). Balthasar will take this even further and find this as true even of finite being. Here Aquinas leads the way: “Our knowledge is so weak that no philosopher will ever be able to investigate perfectly the nature of a single fly.”5 For Balthasar, though, it is not only the weakness of the intellect that blocks complete comprehension, but also the hidden depths of every being, a quality of being “ever-more” that reflects something of the nature of its Creator.
It is in the inexhaustibility of God and of the created order that Balthasar sees the necessity of a limitless theological pluralism. To understand what he means by this, and how it differs from a theological liberalism that admits of no firm doctrines and no possible certitudes, it is helpful to see the analogous phenomenon of a plurality of ways of holiness. Balthasar is well known for advocating for the unity between theology and spirituality, for what he calls a “kneeling theology.” He does this for the health of both theology, which becomes anemic and loses its center when detached from holiness, and for spirituality, which can easily drift into anti-intellectualism or any mode of spiritual excess when unconcerned with the doctrinal nature of the Christian faith. But we can also suggest that spirituality and theology are analogous in the ways in which they admit of limitless instantiations.
In Balthasar’s view, the distension and variability of history are occasions for the manifestation of the glory of God. This is not to say that history becomes necessary to God or that God discovers himself through history. Rather, the multifariousness of the created order, including its temporal flow, is filled with created refractions of the one divine light. As true as that is for history as a whole, the life of the Church in particular offers so many occasions for new witnesses to the one mystery of Christ: “No one knows all the implications of God’s actions which took place in Christ; the history of the Church and the world is there in order to bring them to light, not systematically, but dramatically.”6 Who could have known that standing aloft on a tall pillar for decades (the stylite monks) might not be exactly a way to follow the itinerant Christ? Could the Church have known in the second or third centuries that future saints might take flight, literally, as a demonstration of their divine ardor (Joseph of Cupertino)? Or, instead of moving skywards, the path downwards has also shown the implications of Christ’s poverty (Francis of Assisi) and his cross (the martyrs). From demonstrations of the grandeur of God and his might (visionaries, miracle workers), there have also been countless witnesses to the greatness of a smaller way (Thérèse of Lisieux). The dynamism unleashed by the Great Commission resulted in the energetic preaching and missionary orders (Dominicans and Jesuits), but witness by solidarity and friendship (Charles de Foucauld) unfolds in hitherto unexpected ways the implications of the Church’s call to universality.
All of this, I expect, is rather uncontroversial. The calendar of saints, which ranges from martyr to mystic and from hermit to heroine, is heard as a symphony of seemingly discordant parts that are in fact necessary for the whole. This is how Balthasar sees not only the panoply of saints, but also the history of the Church’s theological tradition. To be sure, heresy must be excluded and more felicitous propositions elevated over misleading or disastrous ones. But Balthasar is interested in a conception of theology in which the full range of human cognition and experience is on offer in order to respond to Revelation. This will include, to be sure, logic in its most exacting forms, and perhaps methods that may very much resemble something like modern conceptions of “science.” An academic, methodologically rigorous investigation of Scripture and ecclesial history can very well unfold for the Church new insights into the deposit of faith. So can, according to Balthasar, that which arises from polemic (Irenaeus against the gnostics, Augustine against Donatism), or from finding oneself torn at the dawning of a new epoch (Pascal, Hamann), or from the pen of poets, playwrights, and novelists (Charles Péguy, Calderón de la Barca, Georges Bernanos) whose mode is more agonistic and affective than deductive and dispassionate. The idiosyncrasy of the saints is not, then, of a different order from the idiosyncrasy of Catholic thinkers, theologians or otherwise.
Without suggesting that the Magisterium can be leveraged to decide between our (admittedly contrived) institutional and idiosyncratic models, it is noteworthy that it has tended not to speak about the existence of schools of thought when it delineates the task and the duties of a theologian or a philosopher.7 Even when it has recommended the thought of Thomas Aquinas in particular, this is largely as a call to imitate the breadth of his vision, his affirmation of the compatibility of faith and reason, and his synthetic view of the mysteries of the faith. And when John Paul II, in Fides et ratio, which also extols the Angelic Doctor, enumerates a list of thinkers who think through the implications of Christian faith, he assembles a list of real eccentrics: “figures such as John Henry Newman, Antonio Rosmini, Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson and Edith Stein and, in an Eastern context, eminent scholars such as Vladimir S. Soloviev, Pavel A. Florensky, Petr Chaadaev and Vladimir N. Lossky.”8 Inasmuch as the Magisterium is a necessarily conservative institution, concerned firstly with the preservation of the true faith, it has also shown itself as capable of rendering hospitality to a host of thinkers who have shed light on the human experience and the experience of faith in ways that are as unexpected as they are illuminating. Although the dispensing of anathemas and the drawing of boundaries are always essential to her task, no institution has shown itself so capable of tolerating, and occasionally even being endeared by, the widest possible range of intellectual mavericks.
As already noted, if theological tradition is indeed largely structured in an institutional manner, the advice for the aspiring theologian would be as we already mentioned: to apprentice in a reputable school of thought, to master it and to contribute to its discourse, so as to serve the broader Church insofar as she is in need of a healthy diversity of theological styles. One would be well advised to be open, ecumenical as it were, towards the other schools, to learn from them and to appropriate for one’s own that which can be serviceable within one’s chosen school. One must then be a certain kind of partisan, even if not a parochial one. Without being moored in a school, the theologian would be cut adrift, would become dilettantish, and her contributions would be cut off from any context. The theologian is to be concerned above all with the revelation of God in Christ, the proper object of all theology, but the school theologian is to see such a revelation as refracted in a particular way, ad mentem Divi Thomae or another chosen luminary.
On the other hand, if the idiosyncratic model is to be preferred, if Balthasar’s narration of theological history is to be trusted, the advice for the aspiring theologian would be more general. Balthasar’s counsel is to become an enthusiast, or if that is stated too flamboyantly, to become one who is capable of seeing something that requires a trained eye to see. To be sure, the study of the requisite languages, the broad familiarity with Scripture, the Fathers, the scholastics, and contemporary scholars will all be necessary for the competent theologian. But so will be askesis, a firm commitment to the Church and its intellectual patrimony (being an ecclesial person, a vir ecclesiasticus), and a host of moral and intellectual virtues that attune one to the object one is shown and sometimes sees with some clarity. One must develop, to use a metaphor from aesthetics, a certain taste, a capacity for judgment that is gained by long familiarity and personal appropriation far more than it is by repeating formulas or appealing to authorities.
It may very well be that sitting at the feet of a master, apprenticing in a school of discourse, is the most sure way to learn to see well, to have one’s taste and judgment refined. But it is not the school and its methods and its authorities that one is developing a taste for, but a taste for God and the manner (the “form” in Balthasar’s language) in which God has manifested his inner life. To see that form, one must be capacitated, must have a certain kind of vision (the “eyes of faith”). One possesses that vision for the form when one has been conformed to it, has taken on something of its contours: “In your light we see light” (Psalm 36:9). The variety of saints and theologians, their particular and occasionally eccentric ways of life and thought, suggest very much that the divine light is maximally polychromatic.
All of this may seem as no more than a means for justifying some of Balthasar’s more startling theological claims. If idiosyncrasy is the rule, then perhaps his particular conception of Christ’s descent into hell, or his argument in defense of the hope for universal salvation, or his speculation about a kind of archetypical humility within the divine nature itself, are to be approved simply because of their novelty and flair. It is indeed true that Balthasar had a penchant for using unconventional terminology to describe God, for instance, to speak metaphorically of “surprise” as characteristic of the relations between the divine persons, to consider the Triune life as an eternal liturgy of mutual adoration. These particular claims, which many take to be the heart of Balthasar’s intractable and potentially destructive idiosyncrasy, are, to be sure, worthy of debate and further refinement. We can, and should, ask whether they are faithful to Scripture and tradition, and describe accurately the way in which Christ reveals the heart of God. Beyond these particular theological positions, however, the question being asked here is whether we have an ample enough notion of tradition in which a degree of variety is not only allowed but expected. Is fidelity to the theological task a matter of repetition and the stalwart refusal of any innovation, or is it the kind of fidelity of those who have already populated theological tradition, which has always demanded a willingness to speak anew, whether in response to new questions and challenges or to “make the word of God fully known, the mystery hidden for ages and generations but now made manifest to his saints” (Colossians 1:26)?
Theological history has an ebb and a flow, and the conditions of the Church and of society may make certain styles of thought more needful than others. That we are now in a period that stands in desperate need of a broader consensus, of a solidification of legitimate schools capable of forming minds together rather than promoting further intellectual fragmentation is highly plausible. The demands of catechesis and seminary formation mean that there is always a need for internally coherent systems of thought that operate more by assertion and self-consistency rather than persuasion and engagement with contemporary questions. Indeed, recent trends in the West seem to suggest that many people, particularly the young, are desiring greater clarity if not something approaching certitude, and this is often discovered in liturgies and styles of thought that present themselves as perennial rather than as the products of recent whim and innovation. There is always a certain need for a kind of “standard theology,” and it may very well be that something like a Balthasarian school of thought could emerge (or perhaps already has) to serve such a purpose alongside other schools. Theology in the 20th century had a strong centrifugal movement, generating such variety of methods and perspectives that left many feeling dizzy. Many today desire for theology in the 21st century to have a stronger centripetal force, a tighter rein on acceptable modalities of theological discourse.
To many, Balthasar presents a life of theological thinking as structurally amorphous, as plastic and unregulated, as containing no limits or bounds. What Balthasar advocated for, on the other hand, was a mode of thinking that gained its solidity and its coherence not from itself alone, not from the rigor of its method, the strict discipline of its language, or the unwavering adherence to its chosen authorities, but from the singularity and unchangeability of its object. That is to say, just as philosophy should be measured against being itself, by how well it describes the contours of the finite order, so theology is ultimately beholden to nothing other than the self-revelation of God in Christ, about which “I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be written” (John 21:25). Some of these books might look like textbooks, some like catechisms and manuals, but some others might look like Catherine of Siena’s The Dialogue, or Jan van Ruusbroec’s The Sparkling Stone. These books might be summas; they might be commentaries on Scripture or on the Lombard’s Sentences; and they might also be something like a Theo-Drama. The question Balthasar would have us ask ourselves is not whether we happen to endorse all of his theological positions, but whether we conceive of tradition, and thus our places in that tradition, capaciously enough. If the idiosyncratic Balthasar still has something to teach us, it might be the reminder that the only way in which we can offer our minds in service to God and the Church is if they are, after all, our minds and not someone else’s.
