Priestly Holiness
Are the Evangelical Counsels Necessary?
Fittingness, though, is not necessity. Priests may grow in charity and all the virtues that it animates, such as obedience and chastity, in any state of life.
What does priestly holiness look like? This is the question that Fr. Kevin E. O’Reilly, O.P., has sought to answer in his 2026 book, In Persona Christi: Priestly Perfection in the Light of St. Thomas’s Theology. This 368-page work published by Sapientia Press represents the latest in a growing number of Thomistic, postconciliar contributions to the theology of the priesthood. While the book is academic in content and style, O’Reilly asserts that his book is no mere esoteric disquisition. A “state of impotence, confusion, and at times chaos” (p. 2) has gripped the priesthood in many parts of the world. “At root,” claims O’Reilly, “the crisis is the issue of personal holiness grounded in an understanding of the true nature of priesthood” (p. 2). Providing such an understanding and elucidating such holiness is exactly what O’Reilly means to accomplish. In large part, I think, he succeeds. He rightly shows that the ontological configuration to Christ wrought by the sacrament of Holy Orders carries with it a demand for moral configuration as well. A priest should be able to act in persona Christi not only sacramentally but also in his very manner of life. For O’Reilly, this moral configuration entails not only virtues such as charity, religion, and prudence, and gifts of the Holy Spirit such as wisdom and counsel, but especially the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience. This is his central claim. “The priest is called to conform all aspects of His [sic] life not only to the words and example of Christ the High Priest,” he writes, “but also to the manner of His life, which is characterized by the evangelical counsels, namely poverty, chastity, and obedience” (p. 6).
It is in this central claim that I detect an infelicitous misstep in an otherwise robust and articulate account of many facets of priestly holiness. As I will explain, In Persona Christi overextends the function of the evangelical counsels, making them indispensable for, rather than conducive to or manifestative of, holiness. Three issues arise from this. First, it effectively turns the counsels into precepts. Second, it conflates the counsels with the integral parts of the moral life of which they are instrumental. Third, it further makes the religious priesthood (the priesthood exercised by men in religious institutes) the type or norm of priesthood. My critique of In Persona Christi is not against the promotion of the evangelical counsels nor their adaptation within the lives of priests. It is about locating the counsels with greater precision in the Christian moral life in general, and the priesthood in particular. Readers will find In Persona Christi to be a fervent appeal for priests to live up to the grandeur of their vocation. They will see a unified moral matrix that connects with sapiential clarity disparate aspects of priestly life and ministry. My hope, however, is for readers to detect the (perhaps rhetorical) overemphasis on the counsels. In what follows, I address the three issues.
First, the counsels are the advice of Jesus Christ, our greatest and wisest friend. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church states, “Christ proposes the evangelical counsels, in their great variety, to every disciple.”1 The word “proposes” marks the counsels as distinct from what Christ “commands” via his precepts. The former are optional or supererogatory; the latter are necessary and obligatory. Yet, the counsels always bear some relation to the precepts, for they both concern the same ends of the moral life. As John Meinert explains, “Commandments concern those actions which are necessarily contrary to the end or necessary to reach the end of virtue. In those acts not concerning necessity, counsels are the recommendation of a [sic] more fitting acts ad finem or the recommendation to avoid certain obstacles to the end.”2 In his work De perfectione vitae spiritualis, for example, Aquinas explains the relationship that six counsels have to the two great precepts of charity: love of God and love of neighbor. Three counsels, namely, the renunciation of earthly possessions, matrimony, and our own will, are meant to facilitate the accomplishment of the precept of love of God. They make it so that the Christian can advance in this perfection more quickly and expeditiously. And yet, Aquinas notes that these are not necessary for perfection. The patriarch Abraham, for example, had arrived at the perfection of charity, and yet he was both married and had great riches. Three other counsels, namely, having affection for one’s enemies, sacrificing our life for the salvation of those who are not in grave spiritual danger, and the conferral of supernatural benefits on others, are meant to express the perfection of the precept of love of neighbor. They show the ne plus ultra that this precept can reach. These six counsels, among the others in the New Testament, belong to the “law of liberty” that Christians enjoy in their pursuit of beatitude. The necessary path to salvation, traced by the precepts, includes many options for fitting exercise expressed by the counsels.
A running issue throughout In Persona Christi consists in making the counsels necessary. Consider these remarks, with emphasis added: “This ontological configuration demands a particular mode of life by virtue of which the priest participates in the form of Christ’s priestly existence. This chapter argues . . . that it entails the evangelical counsels” (p. 49); “their [the counsels] practice in cooperation with God’s grace is indispensable for the execution of the offices (munera) of priest, prophet, and king” (p. 79); “The importance of evangelical poverty for growth in holiness cannot be overstated . . . If one is to advance in sanctity, withdrawal of the affections from worldly things is necessary” (p. 108); the counsels are “the basic conditions” for deiformity and sanctity (p. 142); “they [the counsels] furnish an indispensable condition for the contemplative journey, which for a priest is necessarily ordered” (pp. 147–48); “They [the counsels] provide a necessary foundation for preaching the Word of God” (p. 161); “The practice of the evangelical counsels—poverty, chastity, and obedience—constitutes an indispensable means whereby one can overcome concupiscence of the eyes, concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life” (p. 242); “the key to the increase of infused prudence is the practice of the evangelical counsels” (p. 244); “the alb symbolizes purity, which is properly achieved only by the power of Christ’s Passion. This purity is possible only by the life of virtue that is cultivated by living the evangelical counsels” (p. 307); “A radical embrace of evangelical poverty, chastity, and obedience, as well as study and meditation leading to contemplation, are indispensable conditions for the priest as confessor in particular” (p. 331). These are not occasional overstatements. In Persona Christi repeatedly asserts that the counsels are intrinsic to the holiness of a priest. But is it true that priesthood demands the counsels? That they are necessary and indispensable for the priest to preach, hear confessions, and grow in sanctity?
This question leads to the second issue. It seems that the evangelical counsels in In Persona Christi are sometimes conflated with other moral perfections. There can be an equivocation between the counsels of chastity and obedience and the virtues of chastity and obedience. Simply because someone is being chaste, it does not mean that they are following the counsel of chastity. Simply because someone is being obedient, it does not mean that they are following the counsel of obedience. On the other hand, following the counsel necessarily entails the virtue. These are distinct but interrelated realities.
The virtue of chastity, a part of the cardinal virtue of temperance concerning the right engagement with sexual pleasure, is a matter of precept. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, for instance, treats it under the sixth commandment of the Decalogue. It teaches in no. 2348 that every Christian, regardless of state of life, must have this virtue: “All the baptized are called to chastity.” And yet, the counsel of chastity is something more precise: It is the renunciation of marriage for the kingdom of God. It is not simply being unmarried or celibate, but deliberately remaining so for a supernatural purpose. As Lumen gentium proclaims, “This is a precious gift of divine grace given by the Father to certain souls, whereby they may devote themselves to God alone the more easily, due to an undivided heart.”3 Those who embrace this counsel foster a particular type of chastity, known as the virtue of virginity. The virtue of virginity relates to chastity as magnificence relates to generosity: They are both eminent moral excellences that some people can attain by reason of proper circumstances (such as being unmarried or wealthy).4 It is clear that all priests need the virtue of chastity. But do all priests, simply by virtue of being priests, need to embrace the counsel of chastity? This is to ask if priests, by the very nature of the priesthood, must be unmarried. The Church teaches that this is not the case. As Presbyterorum ordinis states, “It [celibacy] is not demanded by the very nature of the priesthood, as is apparent from the practice of the early Church and from the traditions of the Eastern Churches.”5 The Roman Catholic Church reserves the right to select unmarried men for ordination. There is an eminent fittingness to this, as eloquently taught by Paul VI in Sacerdotalis caelibatus.6 Fittingness, though, is not necessity. In Persona Christi rightly exhorts priests to cultivate the virtue of chastity and to uproot the vice of lust. This task is undoubtedly part of the priest’s own holiness and contributes to the fruitfulness of his ministry. Yet the priesthood, by and of itself, does not demand that a man follow the counsel of chastity. To assert the contrary runs the risk of gainsaying the teaching of Presbyterorum ordinis.
The virtue of obedience is a part of justice whereby a person is moved appropriately by the commands of his or her superiors, human and divine. Like chastity, obedience is a matter of precept; it is not optional in the Christian moral life. The petition in the Lord’s Prayer, “thy will be done,” is an explicit request for greater obedience in conformity to Christ himself.7 However, as Aaron Maddeford explains, “It is not the case that all the acts of a virtue are commanded—some are ‘of counsel,’ better to do but not necessary for salvation.”8 It is good and necessary for a child to obey his or her parents, for citizens to obey just laws, for Christians to obey the precepts of Christ and his Church. Yet, we do not refer to these sorts of obedience as pertaining to an evangelical counsel. We find the counsel of obedience connected to the “law of inner desire for increasingly intense union with God.”9 Out of this desire, one renounces one’s own will and submits in obedience to others in matters that are not necessary but expeditious or fitting for salvation precisely because they fecundate the life of charity. This sort of obedience is not an effervescent or trivial reality. As Hans Urs von Balthasar put it, “An obedience that could not touch and move the basis of one’s whole existence would not be obedience in keeping with the evangelical counsel.”10 Where do we find this sort of obedience? Precisely in what religious undertake by reason of their vows. As Perfectae caritatis states, “In professing obedience, religious offer the full surrender of their own will as a sacrifice of themselves to God. . . . Under the motion of the Holy Spirit, [they] subject themselves in faith to their superiors who hold the place of God.”11 But is this the same obedience that a priest must have? Are following the rubrics at Mass, the lawful directives of a bishop, and the Magisterium of the Church matters of counsel? It seems not. If priests were to do this, they could say, “We are unprofitable servants; we have done what we were obliged to do” (Luke 17:10). In Persona Christi rightly upholds the virtue of obedience (pp. 128–35) and shows how, for a priest, it “can inspire a genuine solicitude for Christ’s flock” (p. 135). But the assertion that priests must follow the counsel of obedience implicates the third issue to which we now turn.
Third, if the counsels are indispensable, necessary conditions for priestly holiness, then it seems that religious priests are per se better priests than their secular confreres. The association between the counsels and the priesthood is clear for religious priests: They have necessarily professed the counsels under a vow elicited by the virtue of religion. Their very state of life (the state of perfection) is inseparable from the evangelical counsels. Lumen gentium no. 44 (and later the Code of Canon Law can. 573 §1) calls religious life “the state which is constituted by the profession of the evangelical counsels.” The opening section alone of the decree on religious life, Perfectae caritatis, explicitly evokes the counsels four times. It makes sense for a Dominican like O’Reilly to see the counsels as keys for the flourishing of the priesthood, “even on the part of secular priests” (p. 336). The counsels are connatural to his own holiness and excellence.
For secular priests, however, the association with the counsels is weaker. They promise respect and obedience to their ordinary;12 they are to foster simplicity of life;13 and they resolve to keep the celibate state perpetually.14 The counsels do not enter the very definition of priesthood. While Presbyterorum ordinis includes poverty, chastity, and obedience individually in its section on special requirements of priestly spiritual life (no. 15–17), it does not name them the evangelical counsels. This was deliberate. While the first draft of the schema De ministerio et vita presbyterorum included “evangelical counsels” in this section’s name, “after it had been objected . . . that by speaking of evangelical counsels one aligned the spirituality of the secular clergy too closely with that of religious, thus taking too little account of its secular character, the word was dropped.”15 In its place the Council fathers decided to call poverty, chastity, and obedience “virtues.” To this day it is a live (and even contentious) question as to not only how but if the counsels are necessary for secular clergy. Laurent Touze, for instance, argues in an incisive article, “Do the counsels belong to the essence of presbyteral spirituality, and are they therefore necessary for the spirituality of the secular priest? To these questions, I propose to answer in the negative.”16 Pope Pius XII, in fact, taught with force, “It is contrary to the truth to assert that the clerical state, as such and as proceeding by divine law, by its very nature or at least by a certain demand of nature, requires that the evangelical counsels be observed by its members.”17 For many secular priests, the imposition of the evangelical counsels is emblematic of the religious life foisting its own measure and standards upon them.18 Is not being a secular priest precisely adopting a framework of Christian holiness and perfection that the religious life has eschewed with its characteristic fuga mundi?
In Persona Christi briefly refers to the difference between religious and secular priests vis-à-vis the counsels as a difference in mode: “These counsels must of course be lived by each individual priest according to the mode of priestly existence to which he has been called” (p. 61, emphasis added). O’Reilly then clarifies, for example, that “one cannot expect a secular priest to live according to the demands of poverty and obedience in the same way as a consecrated religious”; and, of chastity in particular, “the modalities in which this evangelical counsel is lived out differ: the religious must live a common life day in day out with members of the same sex, while the secular priest must often contend with the difficulties that can attend a solitary life” (p. 61, note 67, emphasis added). Having recourse to mode and modality exacerbates the division between religious and secular clergy. The classic Thomistic sense of mode is of “a certain determination of measure.”19 So, if the evangelical counsels are indispensable for the holiness of a priest, and religious, by virtue of their state of life, have a greater measure or mode of the evangelical counsels than seculars, then it follows that religious priests of themselves would be holier than seculars. In Persona Christi states, “While understood simpliciter, these counsels pertain to the religious state, they can nevertheless be taken secundum quid in the case of any believer whatsoever” (p. 242), including priests. If the counsels belong simpliciter to religious priests and secundum quid to secular priests, and the counsels are “indispensable for the execution of the offices (munera) of priest, prophet, and king” (p. 79), then would it not automatically follow that religious priests are better simpliciter at exercising the priesthood? This drives directly into the animus-laden debates regarding priestly perfection that have continuously resurfaced since the time of the mendicant controversies.20 In the development of Presbyterorum ordinis, there was explicit concern to avoid portraying religious priesthood as the “type” of priesthood, such that “the holier a priest is, the more he approaches this ‘type.’”21 It is true that the counsels are proposed to priests as they are to all the faithful. All the faithful may freely respond to the discrete promptings of the Holy Spirit to participate secundum quid in the counsels—and they do so to their own advantage. But to make the counsels pertain simpliciter to the priesthood is to elide a standard of priestly holiness with that of religious life.
The root of this elision is the Christological reflection grounding the first chapter of In Persona Christi. The essential argument is that priestly holiness “is directly predicated on the degree to which the priest imitates the example of Christ, the High Priest” (p. 20). But “Christ’s life is governed by the evangelical counsels” (p. 46). Therefore, inherent to the priestly imitation of Christ is the practice of the evangelical counsels. The weakness of this argument is the connection between Christ’s priesthood and his manner of life. It is true that these two predicates coexist in the same subject. But what is not sufficiently explained is the relation between them in Christ. How is it that “they [the counsels] in effect constitute the existential manifestation of his Priesthood as their ontological ground” (p. 19)? Is there, for example, a necessary, causal link, such that Christ could not have been a priest without this manner of life, or could not have lived this manner of life without being a priest? Did he live the counsels precisely qua priest, or in virtue of something else (such as the plenitude of grace, or charity, or the gifts of the Holy Spirit)? Was his manner of life serving only his priesthood, or did it function more in view of his role as teacher of divine truth? This latter notion seems more consistent with Aquinas’s view expressed in ST III, q. 40. Are priesthood and the counsels so intrinsically connected in Christ that any share in his priesthood necessarily entails accepting the counsels? If this is so, why would the counsels be indispensable conditions for Holy Orders, but not for Confirmation or Baptism? The characters wrought by these sacraments are all real participations in the priesthood of Christ. Yet the counsels remain for all Christians precisely just that: counsels, not precepts.
What does priestly holiness look like? Perhaps there is a reason why, as the first chapter of In Persona Christi notes, “Thomas does not . . . offer any explicit teaching concerning the form of life proper to the priest as such” (p. 20). Holy Orders does not precontain a form of life universally applicable to all its recipients. Married priests in the Eastern Churches, priests in religious institutes and societies of apostolic life, priests of dioceses across the world, all evince the marvelous diversity that priestly service of the Eucharistic and Mystical Body of Christ can entail. It is laudable, meritorious, and efficacious for holiness to imitate the manner of Christ’s life as exemplified by the counsels. But the counsels do not exhaust the manner of Christ’s life nor stand as ends of themselves. It is the theological virtue of charity that remains the singular lodestar of Christian and priestly holiness. The counsels of renouncing possessions, marriage, and one’s own will are all fitting instruments that the Christian may embrace in freedom for the sake of charity. Fittingness, though, is not necessity. Priests may grow in charity and all the virtues that it animates, such as obedience and chastity, in any state of life. It is charity above all that “offers a key to the future flourishing of the Christian priesthood” (p. 336).
Notes
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Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), 2nd ed. (United States Catholic Conference, 2000), no. 915.
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John Meinert, “A Defense of the Command/Counsel Distinction Based on Matthew 19 and 1 Corinthians 7,” Journal of Moral Theology 10, special issue 1 (2021): 116.
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Second Vatican Council, Lumen gentium (November 21, 1964), no. 42.
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See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (ST) II-II, q. 152, a. 3.
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Second Vatican Council, Presbyterorum ordinis (December 7, 1965), no. 16.
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Paul VI, Sacerdotalis caelibatus, (June 24, 1967).
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See CCC, no. 2825.
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Aaron Maddeford, “Obedience, Conscience, and Propria Voluntas in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 86, no. 3 (July 2022): 442–43.
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Mary Christa Nutt, Free for Christ: Religious Obedience and Thomistic Moral Theology (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2024), 268.
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Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Laity in the Life of the Counsels: The Church’s Mission in the World, trans. Brian McNeil, with D. C. Schindler (Ignatius Press, 2003), 108.
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Second Vatican Council, Perfectae caritatis (October 28, 1965), no. 14.
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Ordination of a Bishop, of Priests, and of Deacons (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2021), 72, no. 124.
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CIC, can. 282, §1.
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Ordination of a Bishop, of Priests, and of Deacons, 126, no. 200.
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Friedrich Wulf, “Commentary on the Decree,” in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. 4, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (Crossroad, 1989), 277.
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Laurent Touze, “La spiritualité des conseils évangéliques s’applique-t-elle aux prêtres séculiers?” Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique 116, fasc. 2 (2015): 71.
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Pius XII, Annus sacer (December 8, 1950), sec. II, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 43 (1951): 29.
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See Kenneth E. Untener, “Using the Wrong Measure?” in The Spirituality of the Diocesan Priest, ed. Donald B. Cozzens (Liturgical Press, 1997), 20–26.
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ST II-II, q. 27, a. 6, corp.
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E.g., Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Priesthood and Perfection, trans. E. Hayden (The Newman Press, 1955), 69–89.
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Acta synodalia sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II: Volumen III, periodus tertia, pars IV (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1974), 423: “Quasi tantus sanctior sit sacerdos, quantum magis ad hoc ‘typum’ accedat.”
